[Mailman-Developers] Hashing member passwords in config.pck

[Barry Warsaw]

On Thu, 2005-02-10 at 12:32, John Dennis wrote:

> At
> the same time I think we should implement the stronger password
> generation suggested in this open advisory against mailman.
> 
> http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=can-2004-1143
> 
> I believe this will need a little support in configure.in to detect and
> be able to utilize the presence of /dev/urandom with an appropriate fall
> back in its absence.

This is already in 2.1.6 CVS, and we do a run-time check, first for
Python 2.4's os.urandom() and then for /dev/urandom.  We fallback to the
old scheme if neither of those can be found.

> Then in the MM 3.0 time frame the entire mailman security framework
> should be revisited, there are many security issues that should be
> addressed. At a minimum the suggestion of supporting alternate
> authentication mechanisms (e.g. pam, ldap, kerberos, etc.) should be
> implemented. In my mind, this is too radical for a 2.1.x release. 3.0 is
> the right time debut a more configurable and robust security framework.

I agree completely, although we might be able to fit this into a 2.2
release if there is one.

-Barry

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