[python-committers] Vote on governance will happen between Nov 16 - Nov 30

[Donald Stufft]

> On Oct 23, 2018, at 7:56 AM, Antoine Pitrou <antoine at python.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> Le 23/10/2018 à 13:55, Donald Stufft a écrit :
>> 
>> We’re using IRV and I accept that, but I just want to point out that IRV
>> still has a form vote splitting (in electoral parlance, vote splitting
>> is the “favorite betrayal criterion”
>> - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ. IRV only protects against
>> vote splitting when you have a very weak or a very strong candidate
>> ranked first.
> 
> Do you have a non-video link to an explanation?
> 
> If some form of tactical voting is possible, as a voter I'd like to know
> about it.
> 


To be clear, *all* voting systems have some form of tactical voting as part of them, so this isn’t unique to IRV. I was mostly just pointing out that IRV isn’t a panacea, you can still get a vote splitting like effect. Interestingly, IRV also has the property that sometimes the simple act of voting your true preference *at all* can cause your true preference to lose, and sometimes you would have been better off not voting at all.

I’m struggling to find a resource besides that doesn’t also include shilling for another voting system or isn’t a lengthy paper but https://rangevoting.org/IRVpartic.html <https://rangevoting.org/IRVpartic.html> gives an example and https://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html <https://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html> is a more complex example.


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