Secure Postgres access

[sjdevnull at yahoo.com]

Paul Rubin wrote:
> Reid Priedhorsky <reid at reidster.net> writes:
> > B) Work machine. Run by others, many users. I'd like to also run my
> > database client (Python) here.
>
> Well, just how much do you distrust that machine?  If you think it's
> totally pwned by attackers who will stop at nothing to subvert your
> client, you shouldn't run the client there.

I got the impression that he didn't trust other normal users on the box
but that root wasn't hostile.

> > What I'd like is functionality similar to what Subversion does with
> > "svn+ssh://" URLs: an SSH tunnel that accepts only one connection and
> > doesn't have race conditions.
[SNIP]
> And even if you have an SSH mode that accepts just one connection,
> since your db app is separate and has to connect to the
> forwarding port after you use a separate program open the port,
> how do you stop someone else from grabbing it first?

(I think that's what he meant by "doesn't have race conditions".)

> That seems to mean one of:
>
>   2) authentication through SCM_CREDENTIALS on a PF_UNIX socket

That looks like the best option of those you list.

> Actually, looking at the doc for ssh-agent(1), it looks like it might
> do something like #2 above.  If I understand it, you would run your db
> client as something like
>
>    ssh-agent your-client &

That's cool, I'm looking for something similar, thanks!