Voting Project Needs Python People

[Harry George]

"Alan Dechert" <adechert at earthlink.net> writes:

> "Paul Rubin" <http://phr.cx@NOSPAM.invalid> wrote in message
> news:7x65lv31hf.fsf at ruckus.brouhaha.com...
> > "Alan Dechert" <adechert at earthlink.net> writes:
> > > > 1. Software chooses 1% of votes to change (big enough to have an
> > > >    effect, small enough to maybe go unnoticed).
> > > >
> > > I don't think this is a possible scenario.  However, it brings up an
> > > interesting test for our full blown study (keep in mind, we're trying to
> > > focus on getting the demo done even though people want to jump ahead to
> > > speculate on every possible detail).
> >
> > But something like that seems to have happened in Escambia County,
> > Florida, in 2000.  Out of 21,500 absentee ballots cast, 296 (1.5% of
> > the total) were overvotes with three or more presidential candidates
> > checked.  ZERO were overvotes with exactly two candidates checked.
> > Ballot tampering after the ballots were received is the most plausible
> > explanation.
> >
> But that's a different scenario.  As you described it, the voter never had a
> chance to see the alteration.  The scenario Harry described is where the
> voter has the altered ballot in hand but doesn't notice.
> 

No, I said the paper and the CRT or LCD were correct.  It was just the
electronic storage that was altered.


> > You said that in your system the paper ballots are
> > supposed to take priority over the electronic count if there is a
> > dispute (that's the whole point of having the paper ballots).  So it
> > doesn't matter if the paper and electronic results don't match, and
> > the tampering doesn't have to happen while the voter can still see the
> > ballot.
> >
> I don't see much of a point here.  It will be very hard -- if not
> impossible -- to tamper with the printout in a manner that would go
> undetected.  First of all, overvotes will not be possible at all.  I can't
> quite visualize how you figure someone will alter the printout.  Take some
> whiteout and cover one name and print in a new one?  That would look pretty
> obvious.  Furthermore, the bar code would no longer match the text.  In my
> scheme, the tamperer would have no way to know how to alter the bar code to
> match any alterations in the text.
> 
> Post election checks (canvass period) would involve hand checks, and scanner
> checks of the bar code and the text.  It all has to match.
> 
> > Reference:
> >
> >   http://www.failureisimpossible.com/essays/escambia.htm
> >
> > Note: Paul Lukasiak, the main author of that article, did some of the
> > most thorough analysis of the Florida debacle that I've seen.  I hope
> > you will read a lot of his stuff in designing your real system, so
> > you'll be able to say how your system deals with the problems that he
> > identified in Florida.
> >
> I read as much as possible and will continue to study all of this.  Keep in
> mind that some of the people on our team are leading experts in the field.
> They know all this stuff inside out.  We'll bring in more experts once the
> study is funded.
> 
> Nobody is saying this issue is simple.  Almost everyone that has approached
> the voting mess dilemma and tried to figure it out has grossly
> underestimated the problem.  I have to say I underestimated too but I have
> stuck with it long enough and hard enough to get a handle on it.  Our
> Election Rules Database (the largest component of our proposed study) will
> surface inordinate problems -- get them out in the open where we can deal
> with them.
> 
> Alan Dechert
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

-- 
harry.g.george at boeing.com
6-6M31 Knowledge Management
Phone: (425) 294-8757