ternary operator vote

[Andrew Koenig]

>> So, if the alternatives are A, B, C, D, or no change, you could
>> vote for no change (alone) if you want to express disapproval of
>> any change.

Laura> This is the reason why people will never accept this method of
Laura> voting.  Having decided that I want A, but would rather eat worms
Laura> than accept B, I have no way to protect myself.

Protect yourself from what?

Laura> If I vote my A, and B wins, then it's worm salad for me.

If B gets the most votes even though you didn't vote for it,
B wins.  What's wrong with that?

Laura> If, on the other hand, I so badly want to avoid B that I will
Laura> vote no-change even though I support A, then I haven't helped
Laura> A's cause.  When C wins over A by 2 votes, I will be insensed.

If C wins over A by two votes, C would have won whatever you did.

Laura> And, should one proposal pass, those who genuinely hate any
Laura> change whatsoever will be even angrier.  They will claim, with
Laura> certain justification, that they could have got a majority of
Laura> Pythonistas to vote against _any_ proposal.  However, they
Laura> could not get a majority to vote against _every_ proposal.
Laura> That is a much harder job.  The more proposals the pro camp
Laura> comes up with, the more the vote is stacked so that one of the
Laura> pro outcomes is selected ... unless some of the proposals are
Laura> so horrible that you can mount a scare campaign and say 'vote
Laura> no change or risk seeing this abomination every day'.

The alternative is to stack the deck against any change unless there
is a single change on which nearly everyone can agree.