[ python-Bugs-1722239 ] NamedTuple security issue

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Bugs item #1722239, was opened at 2007-05-20 20:00
Message generated for change (Comment added) made by tiran
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Category: Python Library
Group: Python 2.6
Status: Open
Resolution: None
Priority: 5
Private: No
Submitted By: Christian Heimes (tiran)
Assigned to: Nobody/Anonymous (nobody)
Summary: NamedTuple security issue

Initial Comment:
collections.NamedTuple is using an assert to prevent exec attacks:

assert ''.join(field_names).replace('_', '').isalpha()     
# protect against exec attack
s

asserts are ignored when Python code is run with the -O or -OO flag. I suggest to replace them.



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>Comment By: Christian Heimes (tiran)
Date: 2007-05-20 22:40

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It's less than a ton (how do I weight source code? *g*) but it's used in
some modules. Personally I don't like the usage of exec/execfile and I'm
always worried when I see code that utilizes it. I've created a patch that
checks typename and field_names for non alphanumeric characters.

Bastion.py:    exec testcode
bdb.py:                exec cmd in globals, locals
cgi.py:            exec "testing print_exception() -- <I>italics?</I>"
code.py:            exec code in self.locals
collections.py:    exec template in m
cProfile.py:            exec cmd in globals, locals
doctest.py:                exec compile(example.source, filename,
"single",
hashlib.py:            exec funcName + ' = f'
hashlib.py:                exec funcName + ' =
__get_builtin_constructor(funcName)'
ihooks.py:            exec code in m.__dict__
imputil.py:                exec code in module.__dict__
pdb.py:            exec code in globals, locals
profile.py:            exec cmd in globals, locals
rexec.py:        exec TEMPLATE % (m, m)
rexec.py:        exec code in m.__dict__
runpy.py:    exec code in run_globals
site.py:                exec line
socket.py:        exec _s % (_m, _m, _m, _m)
timeit.py:            exec code in globals(), ns
timeit.py:                    exec _setup in globals(), ns
trace.py:            exec cmd in dict, dict
trace.py:            exec cmd in globals, locals


File Added: NamedTuple_55472.diff

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Comment By: Brett Cannon (bcannon)
Date: 2007-05-20 21:23

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Or you could just not have the security protection in there.  I am sure
there are a ton of other places that are not protected against malicious
use of exec.

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