[Mailman-Users] AOL redacts user addresses even with VERP and full personalization enabled

[Stephen J. Turnbull]

Lindsay Haisley writes:

 > Well the implementation I've developed for use with Resent-Message-ID
 > incorporates a random factor into the AES encryption so that every
 > encryption of the same address is different, although all decrypt
 > properly using the key with which they were encrypted.  This could, of
 > course, be changed.

It sounds like it would be easy enough to make it a parameter, to be
disabled only if a list has trouble with greylisting.

 > > In Mailman 3, I would suppose it won't be hard to store the encrypted
 > > form along with the rest of the user's profile.
 > 
 > Yes, which would make the VERP consistent, if greylisting cares.

I had more in mind very high volume sites where the expense of
encryption would be a factor in achieving timely delivery.