[Mailman-Developers] FYI -- mailback validations no longer safe?
John A. Martin
jam@jamux.com
Sat, 09 Dec 2000 20:36:36 -0500
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>>>>> "CVR" == Chuq Von Rospach
>>>>> "Re: [Mailman-Developers] FYI -- mailback validations no longer safe?"
>>>>> Sat, 9 Dec 2000 15:20:08 -0800
CVR> Second idea puts the onus on the list admin. There is one
CVR> other identifying piece of info we know about the poster that
CVR> can't be forged. it is the IP address of the machine that
CVR> relays the mail to your MLM machine. All of the OTHER
CVR> received lines can be forged, but the one your server adds to
CVR> tell you who it got the mail from -- the direct connection --
CVR> can't be (or you have bigger problems).
Would you unconditionally accept postings received at your list host
from a backup MX?
Once the SMTP-relay check is deployed the spammer will just relay
through one of the target's MX hosts[1].
Checking back through the trace of backup mx hosts could get messy
considering the variations in received header fields, no?
jam
Footnotes:
[1] I've noticed senders that get rejected by MTA anti-spam measures
try a backup MX host shortly thereafter.
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