[Edu-sig] rounding out the debate

[kirby urner]

I don't think Juliano will mind my getting this posted given it was
addressed to edu-sig in the first place....  consider this yet another test.

Kirby



From: Juliano <julianofischer at gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 6:36 PM
Subject: Re: [Edu-sig] raging debates and the relevance of a real education
To: kirby urner <kirby.urner at gmail.com>
Cc: "edu-sig at python.org" <edu-sig at python.org>


2016-03-01 21:50 GMT-04:00 kirby urner <kirby.urner at gmail.com>:

>
> Students lucky enough to get exposure to RSA (the algorithm) along their
> math track are likely having more informed debates in their classrooms,
> regarding the Apple vs. FBI standoff.
>
> They're certainly better equipped, concept-wise, than less privileged kids
> who might not even get any SQL in all four years of high school (!).
>
> The first stories I saw were about how the run-of-the-mill techie saw no
> reason to weigh in i.e. why pick a side?
>

What is your opinion?
Is FBI attacking the privacy of iphone users?

Today the brazilian police arrested Diego Jorge Dzodan, Facebook Latin
America VP. Police claim he disrespect a court order: provide whatsapp
history of drug trafficking suspects. IMO brazilian police was totally
overstated and overbearing. BUT, couldn't the Facebook collaborate with
criminal investigations?

The difference: Facebook indeed has access to the data in question. Apple
did not.



>
>

> Then came the heavy hitters like John McAffee and Gen. Hayden.
>
> An aspect of the story I see differently reported is:
>
> (A)  when the passcode is miss-entered more than 10 times, the phone wipes
> away its data (99% of the stories put it this way)
>
> (B)  the phone doesn't have to wipe anything except the decrypt bits,
> leaving the phone encrypted forever (1% put it this other way). [1]
>
> One might argue the difference between "erased" and "indecipherable" is
> negligible, but as we were discussing "mental models" earlier this month, I
> think it's an important distinction to make.
>
> The "erased" mental model leaves people understanding why the FBI couldn't
> get to the data in that case:  it's gone.  The "forever encrypted" mental
> model reminds people of something else:  the data is still there, just the
> code in uncrackable.
>
> A lot of father-knows-best types (e.g. Cyrus Vance) would like the public
> to forget all about uncrackable codes.
>
> Were the algorithm in question RSA, we could say the phones owner needs
> the passcode to get access to d, the secret complement of N, the public
> key. [2]
>
> Even if I know my public key, forget about decryption of d is lost, and
> that's a lot longer than 6 digits. Getting the passcode right is merely
> giving d permission to do its work.
>
> I wonder how many evil sibs have deliberately miss-entered codes to
> forever lock the other's phone.  That'd be akin to tossing it under a bus
> right?  Tsk. [3]
>
> Kirby
>
> PS:  I wonder who believes this paragraph (I don't):
>
> "It’s possible, of course, for authorities to physically open the phone,
> pull out the computer chips and bombard them with lasers or radio
> frequencies to get at the information they need. But experts aren’t sure
> how much — if any — data would be lost in the process." [4]
>
> Sounds like BS to me.
>

For me as well.

My question: Is the FBI able to clone the data (like a unix dd command)?

Once the data is cloned, they can test as many as required passwords.
When the system blocks the information, they can load the cloned data again.
I apologize if I am talking nonsense. I really would like to know why the
FBI is not able to do it (like CSI lol).



>
> [1]
> https://stratechery.com/2016/apple-versus-the-fbi-understanding-iphone-encryption-the-risks-for-apple-and-encryption/
>
> [2]
> http://controlroom.blogspot.com/2006/05/rsa-using-pythonic-notation.html
>
> [3]
> http://forums.macrumors.com/threads/a-hack-to-find-my-sisters-password-for-the-login-screen.237721/
>
> [4]
> http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/17/the-fbi-wants-to-set-a-legal-precedent-not-break-into-an-iphone/
>
>
>
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A secure communication system is like a weapon: for one is a right, for
others is a danger, a well-meaning citizen can use and a terrorist (or
child molester) too.

+1 FBI team


Juliano Fischer Naves
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